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INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment. A scenic drive along a picturesque highway, it
is a vacation, a trip of a lifetime. Suddenly, the serenity of your surrounding
is interrupted by a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone. You are obliterated. Again, imagine you are in the seclusion of your fenced in backyard.
Lounging, barely clothed, and drenched in suntan lotion, it is your wellearned time off from work. Suddenly, your zone of private reflection is
shattered by the buzzing noise of a Hummingbird drone above. Before you
can cover up, the high-resolution zoom lens of the drone has already completed its mission—to capture multiple images of sunbathers like yourself.
This was a self-led mission by a voyeur rogue law enforcement personnel.
Your privacy is obliterated.
This Orwellian dystopia is no imagination. Rather, it may be coming
sooner than any of us can imagine. Welcome to the post-modern America—
where society may be heading to a fast track dissent into the abyss of limitless government surveillance. The domestic drones have arrived, and they
are almost ready to intrude upon our sacrosanct zone of private seclusion.2
The above scenarios are certainly not this author’s imagination. They are
not bad dreams or morbid fantasies either. Instead, they are based on the
recorded incidences of killer drones wreaking havoc in the civilian communities in the rugged mountains of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen.3 The
Review, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Temple Political & Civil
Rights Law Review, Fordham International Law Journal, Santa Clara Law Review, Michigan State International Law Journal, Loyola Law Journal, Washburn Law Journal, and
Miami Law Review, among others. The author would like to thank Jennifer Schulke for her
assistance in legal research and typing of the manuscript. Also to my beautiful children—
Shreyoshi and Sayantan, I owe much for their love and support. Dr. Ghoshray can be
reached at sabyghoshray@sbcglobal.net.
1. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11,
1755), reprinted in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (Leonard W. Labaree
ed., 1963).
2. See Yochi J. Dreazen, From Pakistan, with Love: The Technology Used to Monitor the Skies over Waziristan Is Coming to Your Hometown, NAT’L J., Mar. 13, 2011,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/drones-may-be-coming-to-your-hometown20110313.
3. See Christopher Drew, Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?_r=1&hp;
see also David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death from Above, Outrage Down
Below,
N.Y.
TIMES,
May
16,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the
use of drones—a type of unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV”)—in military operations has
steadily grown); see also Mary Louise Kelly, Officials: Bin Laden Running Out of Space to
Hide, NPR, June 5, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104938490
(stating that the pace and precision of drone attacks has increased steadily); see generally
Effective Counterinsurgency: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan Military Partnership: Hearing
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very same drones are now waiting for either a legislative nod or the regulatory approval to begin hovering over the byways and alleys of America.
Yet, it seems the national discourse has not awakened to this new reality.
These drones are relatively cheap to build, remotely controlled, and
devoid of emotions and physiological limitations. Today’s drones can both
strike with deadly finality4 and peer deep into individual homes with seethrough imaging capability,5 high-powered zoom lenses,6 and night-vision
capability.7 This emerging new reality will soon be at the horizon of American social landscape for various reasons. First, the public proclamation of
success in containing al-Qaeda8 has emboldened the current administration.
This has created a fertile ground for law enforcement agencies in various
states to deploy drones for domestic surveillance.9 Second, previously limited as an aid in border protection,10 drones have now become a desirable
necessity for law enforcement across the nation.11 Third, despite the federal
Before the Full Comm. of the Comm. on Armed Serv., 111th Cong. 21 (2009) (statement of
David Kilcullen, Partner, Crumpton Group, LLC, Senior Fellow, EastWest Institute, Member of the Advisory Board, Center for a New American Security) (discussing the unpopularity of drone strikes and the casualties caused to civilians when using drones for military purposes).
4. See Drew, supra note 3.
5. See Department of Defense Resource Center, Ground Moving Target Indicator
(GMTI) Radar Discrimination of Combatants versus Animals in Severe Clutter, DARPA,
(topic
number
SB082-019),
available
at
http://www.dodsbir.net/sitis/archives_display_topic.asp?Bookmark=32303; see generally
Mathew R. Lopez, Sandia National Laboratories, Synthetic Aperture Radar Applications
(2005) http://www.sandia.gov/radar/sarapps.html; Alicia Tejada, MIT Develops New Radar
Technology: Military Could See Through Walls, ABC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/radar-technology-mit-walls/story?id=14773871.
6. See William Saletan, Nowhere to Hide, SLATE, Sept. 17, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2008/09/nowhere_to_hide.
html; See also Greg Miller & Julian E. Barnes, Special Drones Pursue Militias, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/12/world/fg-pakistan12.
7. See Austin Richards, Digital Reflected-Ultraviolet Imaging, ADVANCED
IMAGING,
18-20
(Apr.
2006)
available
at
http://www.uvcorder.com/pdf/ADI0406%20Component%2018-20.pdf.
8. See Fred Lucas, Obama Has Touted Al Qaeda’s Demise 32 Times Since Benghazi Attack, CNSNEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-toutsal-qaeda-s-demise-32-times-benghazi-attack-0#sthash.s1Q9pRfy.dpuf.
9. See W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217;
see
also Brian Bennett, Police employ Predator drone Spy planes on home front, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-drone-arrest20111211,0,72624,full.story.
10. Id.
11. See James Nelson, Utah City May Use Blimp as Anti-Crime Spy in The Sky,
REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/16/us-crime-blimp-utahidUSTRE70F1DJ20110116; see also Stephen Dean, Police Line Up to Use Drones on Patrol
After
Houston
Secret
Test,
EXAMINER.COM,
Jan.
11,
2010,
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government’s reluctance in allowing pervasive use for fear of aviation safety,12 recent presidential declarations13 and congressional authorization14 has
brought this drone-induced Orwellian dystopia into palpable reality. Domestic drones have the potential to obliterate individual privacy and transmogrify the traditional way of life. Yet, the public hue and cry is well muted. Why? This Article examines the issue in two threads. In the first, it dissects the factors that brought us face-to-face with this impending reality. In
the second, it analyzes a set of constitutional, ethical, and philosophical
reasons for the illegitimacy of future deployment of domestic drones. Thus,
this Article proceeds as follows:
Part II examines the current landscape to identify the socio-legal factors that may have contributed to the emergence of the mindset of domestic
surveillance. Identifying the post-9/11 landscape as the primary contributor
to an emerging reality of a security-centric society, this Part evaluates how
jurisprudence may have attenuated the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, while enabling the law enforcement framework to rise above
individual privacy concerns. Part II also analyzes the reasons and societal
factors that have given rise to the sociological apathy towards a growing
privacy disaster in our horizon.
Part III examines how the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
can still be a viable bulwark against an all-pervasive imposition of a drone
culture. By analyzing the aspiratory dimensions of the Framers’ view and
evaluating the continued applicability of older cases in analogues behavior
in the post-modern era, this Part identifies why an individual’s expectation
of privacy when decoupled from the shaping effect of society’s mass hysteria may be an objective measure to reject drone surveillance.
Part IV delves into a fundamental analysis of the impending domestic
surveillance. By combining social contract theory with the deeper liberty
principles espoused by Warren and Brandeis, this Part drives home that
individuals in the contemporary American society have a fundamental right
and long-standing inheritance to be secure within their private seclusion.
Finally, Part V concludes that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
may still be robust enough to address complexities arising out of drone surhttp://www.examiner.com/article/police-line-up-to-use-drones-on-patrol-after-houstonsecret-test; see also Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely
to Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/22/AR2011012204111.html; see also Neal Ungerleider, Oklahoma Wants to Reserve Airspace for Drones, TPM IDEA LAB, July 26, 2011,
http://idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/07/oklahoma-blocks-off-airspace-fordrones.php.
12. See Lucas, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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veillance and when taken in conjunction with social contract theory, may
present a strong rationale for rejecting drones introduction at this time.
II.

CANVASSING THE LANDSCAPE—FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT

The seduction of drones within the law enforcement parlance is a
product of two diverging strands of societal progression—superior technological advancement and debilitating addiction of fear. The use of drones
and their superficial success in dealing with terror suspects on foreign
shores has jump started this seduction, which unfortunately is unfolding
into a future state of affairs that would shrink individual privacy to a nonexistent dystopian reality. Despite technology’s broader intrusion into our
lives, privacy is still recognized as a fundamental life force of human existence. There is a universal recognition of privacy as a necessary steppingstone for fulfilling the promise of individual liberty.15 Yet, technology’s
advancement has allowed individual privacy to rapidly shrink along many
dimensions. With the reality of drones buzzing the domestic skylines, the
time is now for an introspective look at the emerging chasm between privacy law’s inert contour and technology’s innovative trajectory.16 In this
evolving reality, mass adoption of drones for law enforcement is simply
following the contour of least resistance by developing societal conditions
that are conducive to lowering individuals’ subjective evaluation of privacy.
Will the drone culture destroy individual privacy for the post-modern individual? Is domestic surveillance a constitutionally sanctified governmental
intrusion? The facial inconsistency of this new paradigm calls for a reevaluation of both the constitutional framework and ethical dialectic of this
drone-induced privacy intrusion.17 However, before we do that, let us trace
the roots of the culture of fear that enabled where we are today as a society—a society that stands at the precipice of a massive intrusion of our private lives by governmental machineries. This is the shaping effect of 9/11.

15. See Scott Ness, Comment, The Anonymous Poster: How to Protect Internet
Users’ Privacy and Prevent Abuse, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, ¶ 1 (noting that the right
to privacy is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
16. See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the ThirdParty Doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33 (2011) [hereinafter
Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale]. See, e.g., Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 239, 239 (noting we must look at the tension between law and technology more
broadly than we have in the past), 241 (noting that the law has fallen behind technology).
17. See generally Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale, supra note 16.
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EXAMINING THE SHAPING EFFECT OF 9/11

The saga of 9/11 is a unique historical event in American history.18 Its
uniqueness is manifested in its ability to inculcate within the social-legal
landscape both a perpetual addiction to fear19 and a faulty perception of
American exceptionalism,20 as I have shown elsewhere.21 Besides introducing an all-pervasive existential threat, 9/11 introduced a lingering effect on
jurisprudence.22 So sweeping is the post-9/11 fear psychosis that a securitycentric mass hysteria has percolated from the masses to the military establishment and from the government to the law enforcement.23 Because of an
all-pervasive desire to be insulated from this existential threat, the administration and law enforcement agencies have promoted an environment that
has shaped various judicial determinations indexed at advancing the security agenda of law enforcement.24 The natural outcome of the process is a
18. See generally Saby Ghoshray, Guantánamo: Understanding the Narrative of
Dehumanization Through the Lens of American Exceptionalism and Duality of 9/11, 56
WAYNE L. REV. 163 (2011) [hereinafter Ghoshray, Guantánamo] (providing an in-depth
discussion of the shaping effect of 9/11).
19. Id.
20. This can be understood from the framework of American exceptionalism. A
misconstrued notion of “exceptionalism” manifested itself in developing a distorted sense of
vulnerability post-9/11, which provoked a mad quest for “invulnerability” within the social
construct. While literature is replete with references, the media has carefully crafted the
image that “America is a world unto itself,” such that the physical attack of 9/11 magnified
multifold in its psychological impact domestically. See Paul Dibb, America—a World unto
Itself,
ON
LINE
OPINION,
Jan.
29,
2007,
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=5428. Despite the advancement of technology narrowing the physical gap between the United States and the rest of the world,
America has become both a very involved, yet surprisingly aloof nation as it relates to international affairs. Compare Tom Koch, Care, Compassion, or Cost: Redefining the Basis of
Treatment in Ethics and Law, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 130, 135 (2011) (noting that the United
States has spent more than a trillion dollars to support the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
over the past ten years), with Aya Gruber, An Unintended Casualty of the War on Terror, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 302 (2011) (noting that America has become more isolationist after
9/11). This isolationist viewpoint, therefore, not only accentuates America’s sense of vulnerability but also provides a snapshot of how the national collective consciousness may have
been manipulated into developing an existential vulnerability, while developing an intensely
defeatist attitude that requires an earth-shattering response.
21. See generally Ghoshray, Guantánamo, supra note 18 (discussing how a flawed
conception of exceptionally has entered the contemporary American discourse post 9/11).
22. Id at 261-64 (discussing the illegitimacy of post-9/11 detentions at Guantánamo
and subsequent challenges raised at the Supreme Court).
23. Id.
24. See Thomas P. Crocker, Still Waiting for the Barbarians: What is New About
Post-September 11 Exceptionalism?, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 303, 308-09 (2007) (noting that
the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld were mere
“procedural solutions that leave unasked and unanswered the underlying substantive questions about what is being done through this perhaps new exceptionalism”).
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restriction in individual liberty with a concomitant retrenchment of individuals’ privacy.25 Against this emerging restrictive covenant of law enforcement, the encroachment upon individual liberty must be recognized. The
reality of law enforcement today is premised on a flawed existential need
for security,26 which propelled the evolving new reality of domestic surveillance by drones.
B.

ATTENUATION OF THE ORIGINAL INTENTION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

Surveillance via drones is a violent assault against individual privacy.
The Framers introduced the Fourth Amendment as a constitutional bulwark
against privacy violation. It was intended to protect private space and personal property, including an individual’s zone of private seclusion. Thus,
the original contour of the Fourth Amendment was shaped by the Framers’
natural conception of common law. As the Framers were predominantly
driven towards prohibiting trespass into an individual’s secluded zone of
private affairs, they were reluctant to allow law enforcement wider discretion within the search and seizure framework. Unfortunately, various interacting components of privacy, fundamental possessory interest, trespass
prohibition, and the warrant requirement posed doctrinal difficulties for the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. However, later jurisprudence allowed
wider latitude in police search and seizure on account of exigencies of situations. Regardless of facial exigencies articulated by law enforcement,
allowing domestic surveillance by drones will certainly jeopardize such
trespass barriers, which until now has been solemnized in law as a constitutional inheritance of the U.S. citizen. As the post-9/11 societal landscape
continues to dilute the various sacrosanct constitutional grants, such as the
individual privacy, the absence of passionate discourse on drones intruding
our privacy is a hallmark of a society that is gradually failing to recognize
its constitutional roots. Yet, this failure is the historic emerging reality of
the twenty-first century evolution of the Fourth Amendment.
The modern doctrinal constructions of the Fourth Amendment have
authorized carving out countless exceptions to warrantless searches. However, this evolution in jurisprudence is contrary to the original intent. The
post-Framing period has witnessed the Supreme Court crafting various exceptions to the warrant requirement. This outgrowth of creative judicial
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was primarily designed to satisfy
the needs of law enforcement’s administrative responsibilities. As political
manipulation started to shape societal aspirations for individual liberty,
25.
26.

See Ghoshray, Guantánamo, supra note 18, at 259-64.
Id.
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judicial constructions began to relegate individual liberty interests in favor
of administrative interests.27 As a result, the judiciary began to grant maximal discretion to the law enforcement administrative mechanisms. With
this, the doctrinal components of warrantless search and seizure and law
enforcement trespass became distorted by the predominance of the basic
law paradigm.28 Consequently, police power rose asymmetrically, and warrantless intrusions became the prominent Fourth Amendment concern for
individuals. Thus, the amendment’s original aspiration has become nearly
forgotten under the reality of modern times and, now, is quickly losing its
original context and relevance.
The above interpretative lens of law enforcement’s trespass into an individual’s private space provides a necessary construct through which to
understand drone surveillance’s deleterious impact on individual privacy.
While the framing period’s privacy debate was focused at securing a person’s right from physical trespass, the construct nonetheless calls for a revitalized discussion. Therefore, in our current discourse, we must introspect
over how secure a person’s secluded zone of private affairs must be from
digital and remote trespass via unmanned aerial vehicles.
C.

NATIONAL SECURITY FOCUS DRIVING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENDA

The post-9/11 exigency developed a fearful collective consciousness
that called for temporary suspension of basic liberties.29 This emboldened
law enforcement to intrude upon individual privacy.30 Residing within this
existential fear paradigm is an alarmist variant of national security mind-

27. See Saby Ghoshray, Doctrinal Stress or in need of a face lift: Examining the
Difficulty in Warrantless Searches of Smartphones Under the Fourth Amendment’s Original
Intent, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 571, 598-99, 607-10 (2012) [hereinafter Goshray, Doctrinal
Stress] (noting the post-framing period’s interjection of many exceptions into the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirements to facilitate law enforcement interest over individual
privacy).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808 (1974); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977).
29. See Saby Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigm of Indefinite Detention:
Security, Liberty and False Dichotomy in the Aftermath of 9/11, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 249,
264 (2006) [hereinafter Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigm].
30. See generally John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring
Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and
the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2002)
(“Under the guise of stopping terrorism, law enforcement officials and government leaders
have now been given the right to conduct searches of homes and offices without prior notice,
use roving wiretaps to listen in on telephone conversations, and monitor computers and email messages . . . .”).
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set31 that advocates suspension of individual privacy.32 Thus, by making
individual privacy subservient to the security mechanism excess, the
framework has been able to advance an overarching surveillance agenda by
law enforcement.33 The judiciary has enabled this flawed framework by
allowing a significantly lower threshold of material evidence, which has led
to the gradual erosion of individual privacy rights.34
Viewing the emerging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence through this
prism of post-9/11 culture of fear reveals a curious distortion within the
struggle between competing interests of law enforcement’s prosecution
interest and individual privacy interests.35 As individual privacy interests
continue to get subsumed into a pervasive governmental criminal prosecution interest,36 the unanimous call for drone deployment for domestic law
enforcement has gained momentum. The contextual relevance within a systemic framework is important in conceptualizing the backdrop of this new
drone phenomenon. Historically, the judicial branch can act as a neutral
bulwark against governmental distortionary impact on society. Unfortunately, if the judiciary becomes unduly influenced by the shaping effect of any
externally imposed new stimulus, the evaluation of competing merits of
interacting interests37 finds that, often times, the individual’s right becomes
sublimated against broader interests. As the national security interest is
pervasively injected within the current system, its deleterious effects on
common law enforcement practices are often ignored in contemporary discourse. Judging by the yardstick of the last decade’s saga of judicial determination of security-infected law enforcement prosecution, the contours of
individual privacy have become unduly constrained.38 During this period,
31. See generally Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigm, supra note 29 (discussing this phenomena at length).
32. Id. at 218 n.301; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 30, at 1084.
33. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 30, at 1083-84.
34. In case after case since 2001, judges in the federal court system have observed
that temporary suspension of individual privacy interests can be allowed if doing so would
further law enforcement investigative objectives. See Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a
Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus
the National Interest—The Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 71-72 (2004).
35. Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghost in the Global War on Terror: Critical Perspectives
and Dangerous Implications for National Security and the Law, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 561, 580
(2011).
36. Id.
37. James D. Phillips & Katharine E. Kohm, Current and Emerging Transportation
Technology: Final Nails in the Coffin of the Dying Right of Privacy?, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
1, 10 (2011) (arguing that advances in technology have led to Supreme Court decisions that
have created confusion in Fourth Amendment privacy law).
38. See Gross, supra note 34, at 68 (noting that the Katz Court eliminated the trespass rule for determining whether law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment due to
changes in technology).
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more often than not, the judiciary’s relative emphasis on security over individual privacy resulted in providing law enforcement with much wider latitude than necessary.39 Recognizing this would allow us to recognize the
fertile landscape on which domestic surveillance of common citizens is
forthcoming unless the Fourth Amendment rises from its current attenuation for over almost a century.
III.

DRONES THROUGH THE LENS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

Within the international arena, drones have become efficient killing
machines, engaging in targeted killing of terrorists by adopting a legal
framework for an expanded conception of hostilities.40 As I have noted
elsewhere,41 such targeted killings gave rise to significant civilian casualties
and collateral damages that raised limited protest because of the invocation
of the “the law of 9/11.”42 Through its contradiction with the human rights
39. I refer to the general legal environment that emerged post-9/11, in which simple
criminal offenses have been upgraded to include serious charges against individuals on
either questionable legal precedents or incomplete evidence. See Charles Doyle, Cong. Res.
Service, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, RL 31377, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, 5152 (2002); Andrew Ayers, The Financial Action Task Force: The War on Terrorism Will
Not Be Fought on the Battlefield, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 449, 458 (2002); Whitehead
& Aden, supra note 30, at 1084-85; Marc Cooper, Uncensored Gore: The Take-NoPrisoners Social Critic Skewers Bush, Ashcroft and the Whole Damn Lot of Us for Letting
Despots Rule, L.A. WKLY., Nov. 20, 2003, http://www.laweekly.com/2003-1120/news/uncensored-gore/. See generally Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigm, supra
note 29 (discussing the government’s use of the “Laws of War” model and “unlawful combatant” status).
40. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A
Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL
FORCE
IN
CONTEXT
3
(Simon
Bronitt
ed.,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (noting that a strike on Yemen in 2003 was concluded to be a clear extrajudicial killing).
41. See Saby Ghoshray, Targeted Killing in International Law: Searching for
Rights in the Shadow of 9/11, (forthcoming) [hereinafter Ghoshray, Targeted Killing].
42. By the “law of 9/11,” I refer to a general trend in the post-9/11 jurisprudence
that promotes a broader right to kill and is premised on U.S. political thought process that is
decoupled from accepted framework of international law. The law of 9/11 can be identified
through scholarships premised on U.S. entitlement to a flexible regime that allows for acts,
such as, indefinite detention, targeted killing by extrajudicial means, torture in secret CIA
prisons, etc. For literature that exemplifies law of 9/11 in the context of targeted killing, see,
e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, 346-400 (Benjamin Wittes,
Brookings Institution Press 2009); Saby Ghoshray, Untangling the Legal Paradigm, supra
note 29 (providing a general discussion of how the law of 9/11 has impacted almost every
aspect of American Law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors
Through a Global War on Terror, 43 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 435 (2005) (explaining why
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law’s sanctity of life paradigm, and in its contrarian position with the customary international law’s due process paradigm, adoption of targeted killing has undoubtedly created some ripples in international jurisprudence.43
Domestic drones, on the other hand, are not subjected to the vagaries of

the evolving law of 9/11 may fall outside the legal norms of international law); John Yoo,
Using Force, 71 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004) (discussing the law of 9/11 in the context of
the general U.S. right in global war).
43. While discussing the scope distinction of IHL and HRL, there is a tendency of
the States to invoke IHL in order to avoid HRL’s stricter guidelines for behavior in hostilities while being governed by IHL’s more permissive guidelines supervising killing. In this
context, Special Rapporteur recently observed:
[B]oth the US and Israel have invoked the existence of an armed conflict
against alleged terrorists (“non-state armed groups”). The appeal is obvious: the IHL applicable in armed conflict arguably has more permissive rules for killing than does human rights law or a State’s domestic
law, and generally provides immunity to State armed forces. Because the
law of armed conflict has fewer due process safeguards, States also see a
benefit to avoiding compliance with the more onerous requirements for
capture, arrest, detention or extradition of an alleged terrorist in another
State. IHL is not, in fact, more permissive than human rights law because of the strict IHL requirement that lethal force be necessary. But
labeling a situation as an armed conflict might also serve to expand executive power both as a matter of domestic law and in terms of public
support.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Addendum: Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, para. 47 (May 28, 2010). In the context of the legality of killing, HRL
and IHL may apply coextensively and simultaneously unless there is a conflict between
them. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudical,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions (Mr. Philip Alston), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7, (Dec. 22,
2004), para. 46; Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20 (Jan. 29, 2007), paras. 18-19;
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum: Mission to the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/2/Add.5 (May 28,
2009), paras. 71-73, 83; Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions: Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Government and Replies Received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, 222 (Mar. 12, 2007), pp. 342-58; Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and
Replies Received, at 264-65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006); Report of
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum:
Summary of Cases Transmitted to Government and Replies Received, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, 222 (Mar. 12, 2007), pp. 358-61. In situations that do not involve the
conduct of hostilities, where law enforcement operations during non-international armed
conflict can be supported, the lex generalis of human rights law would apply. See MICHAEL
N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: WITH COMMENTARY 1.2 (2006).
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conflicting and interacting statutes of international law44 and have largely
stayed under the radar of public discourse. Given the robustness of American domestic jurisprudence, could we then rely on the Constitution to protect citizens from governmental acquiescence to all-pervasive drone surveillance?
A.

BULWARK FROM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

As we sit at the precipice of an impending governmental intrusion in
our technology-fueled privacy space, we must attempt to understand how
the Fourth Amendment’s continued viability may still contradict with aspirations of today’s law enforcement.45 Technology’s explosion, digital immersion, and speed and access of data transfer have metamorphosized the
ability of surveillance and privacy intrusion. From spy satellites prying inside an individual bedroom to killer drones tracking individuals through
rugged terrain, automation has changed the modes by which a supervisory
entity can intrude upon individual privacy. How the trajectory of intrusion
may change in the drone era is the operative paradigm through which we
must understand how the Fourth Amendment would respond to such violation of privacy. For a more nuanced understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s implication, we must segment this part of the analysis to separate
the Framers’ original understanding of privacy and how jurisprudence has
responded to automation-fuelled surveillance in the past.
1.

Drones in American Sky—an Anathema to the Framers’ View

The Fourth Amendment is anchored in ensuring the inherent sanctity
of an individual’s home.46 The right to be secure in one’s dwelling is the
fundamental precept of American privacy jurisprudence.47 Spy satellites
and unmanned aerial vehicles hovering over an individual’s home will give
unbridled access to the details of an individual’s home. Currently, no other
technology has such an overwhelming ability to intrude into inner sanctums
44. See generally Ghoshray, Targeted Killing, supra note 41 (discussing in detail
the various relevant statutes of international law currently being used to justify drone warfare).
45. See Adam Liptak, Justices Wrestle Over Allowing DNA Sampling at Time of
Arrest,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
26,
2013,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/supreme-court-hears-arguments-on-dnasampling.html (“For now, Justice Scalia said, the law’s purpose is ‘to catch the bad guys,
which is a good thing.’ But, he added, ‘the Fourth Amendment sometimes stands in the
way.’”).
46. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 552, 576-77 (1999).
47. Id. at 551.
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of individual dwellings. Introducing drones for domestic surveillance will
usher in an era that will not have any point of return. Thus, once surveillance drones are allowed as a preventive law enforcement mechanism, or
for surveillance, our existing conceptions of fundamental liberty will be
instantly incinerated. The Framers viewed any unreasonable intrusion into
private dwellings as rather sacrilegious, which is echoed in their deeprooted distrust of law enforcement searches.48
The most significant element of the amendment was . . . the
generic concept of [unreasonable search and seizure] . . . .
The amendment’s first clause, which explicitly renounces
all unreasonable searches and seizures, overshadows the
second clause, which implicitly renounced only a single
category, the general warrant. The framers of the amendment were less concerned with a right against general warrants than with the broader rights those warrants infringed.
The history that preceded the Fourth Amendment . . . reveals a depth and complexity that transcend[s] language.
To think of the amendment as a right against general warrants disparages its intricacy. The amendment expressed
not a single idea but a family of ideas whose identity and
dimensions developed in historical context.49
Ironically, drone surveillance will usher in an era of unwarranted intrusion into private lives—the very apprehension that prompted the Framers
to conceptualize the Fourth Amendment as a bulwark against such excessive and unwarranted intrusion into individual’s private space,50 as can be
gleaned from historical texts outlining the developmental history of the
Fourth Amendment:
[T]hat the said Constitution be never construed to authorize
Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press, or the
rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of the United
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms; or to raise standing armies, unless when necessary
for the defence of the United States, or of some one or
more of them; or to prevent the people from petitioning, in
a peaceable and orderly manner, the federal legislature, for
48. WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS
MEANING 602-791, at 765-72 (2009).
49. Id. at 765-66, 770.
50. Davies, supra note 46, at 551.
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a redress of grievances; or to subject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, papers or
possessions.51
This observation provides an indication of how the Fourth Amendment’s
original contours related to search and trespass may stand in stark contradiction to the emerging law enforcement desire to populate the domestic
skies with surveillance drones.52 Clearly, by making the scope, context, and
boundary of a search warrant as the operative content of the Fourth
Amendment, the Framers ensured that their view of life and liberty would
be reflected in any future attempt to introduce life altering elements, like
drones, into the equation.53
2.

Drones through the Prism of the Karo-Knotts Doctrine

The Court originally addressed the technological nuances of the tension between governmental intrusion and individual privacy through the
Karo-Knotts framework.54 The Court upheld Fourth Amendment rights in
United States v. Karo55 by finding intrusive elements in beeper surveillance
where police revealed activities inside a private dwelling.56 In contrast, in
United States v. Knotts,57 the Court rejected the Fourth Amendment claims
on the grounds that the usage revealed critical facts about the interior of the
premises that the government was interested in knowing, and such information could not have been obtained without a warrant.58 What does the
Karo-Knotts framework inform us about the Supreme Court’s view on
drone surveillance? This nuanced framework fundamentally rests on revealing physical encroachment inside a private dwelling.59 Here, physical intru51. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, AND WHICH FINALLY RATIFIED THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 86-87 (William White, Printer to the Commonwealth 1856).
52. See generally Dean, supra note 11.
53. Id.
54. See William Curtiss, Note, Triggering a Closer Review: Direct Acquisition of
Cell Site Location Tracking Information and the Argument for Consistency Across Statutory
Regimes, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 139, 159 n.103 (2011).
55. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (involving the interior of a home
where homeowners intended to conceal their activities).
56. Id. at 727-28.
57. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1988).
58. Id. at 284-85.
59. See, e.g., David H. Goetz, Note, Locating Location Privacy, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 823, 832 (2011) (“Taken together, Knotts and Karo are generally understood to
mean that the government is free to place a tracking device on a suspect’s car without a
warrant and track the suspect’s movements on public roads, but cannot obtain information
about a suspect’s home from such a device without a warrant.”).
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sion is recognized as the tipping point in privacy violation.60 With an allpervasive digital immersion, the same construction can be extended in an
analogous scenario dealing with remote controlled intrusion via drones,
which indeed will be a delineating factor in identifying when a privacy violation occurs.
3.

Surveillance Drones and the Individual Expectation of Privacy

Technological advancement, the shaping effect of 9/11, and the Fourth
Amendment’s doctrinal difficulties have all contributed to this emerging
paradigm of drone surveillance. Yet, fundamental liberty consequences
from drones can be efficiently conceptualized by developing a deeper insight into the individual privacy dimension of the Fourth Amendment.61
The Fourth Amendment’s recognition of the individual right to privacy was
solidified under the framework designed in Katz v. Unites States.62 Despite
emerging views as seen through the nuanced analysis of the Karo-Knotts
framework, Katz remains the predominate anchor for the broader doctrinal
implications of the Fourth Amendment,63 as it provides one of the most
elegant and robust frameworks for individual privacy protection through
whose lens the issue of drone surveillance can be reviewed.64
Let us now place drone surveillance within the framework of a Katzian
construction of a subjective evaluation of individual privacy that is indexed
at society’s objective expectation. In the event of a drone buzzing over an
individual’s backyard—one of many possible scenarios in a domestic surveillance regime—we must first identify whether a targeted individual has a
subjective expectation of privacy.65 We must then evaluate this subjective
60. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (2010) (noting that a search is triggered for
Fourth Amendment purposes when officers enter enclosed spaces).
61. See supra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
62. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
63. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”
Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. Id. While echoing similar understanding of Justice Harlan’s famous test in Katz,
Peter Winn observed:
[In] Justice Harlan’s concurrence on its merits, we have seen that in
working on the reasonable expectation of privacy test, he refined the test
in his own way, adding both a subjective and an objective component.
Perhaps he thought that the subjective component was needed to clarify
that, although an objective expectation of privacy might exist, a subjective expectation might not, as when a person in his (objectively private)
home is overheard intentionally speaking in a loud voice out of on [sic]
open window. . . . Perhaps Justice Harlan felt the subjective component
of the test was still needed to mirror the old trespass element that an in-
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expectation of privacy by determining whether an individual’s expectation
of privacy is a reflection of society’s objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy.66 Therefore, this framework involves an equality mechanism
whereby collective objective parameters factor in to make a deterministic
evaluation of an individual’s subjective expectation.67 Therefore, this analysis now turns into a rhetorical question: Do Americans as a society have a
reasonable expectation of being insulated from the prying eyes of drones in
the sky?
If we look through this construction, we can clearly see how the shaping effect of 9/11 can have disastrous consequences for an individual’s privacy interest.68 Post-9/11 addiction of fear has already infected society’s
perception in such a way that some communities might indeed be aligned
with law enforcement in having drones over their skies. Yet, an individual’s
subjective expectation of privacy is more fundamental in nature, especially
in matters related to an individual’s private affairs.69 In this context, two
important observations are worth noting. First, Katz’s two-pronged test
relies upon a collective evaluation to identify individual privacy’s contour.
Second, a deterministic evaluation of an individual’s expectation is dependent on society’s view. This, therefore, would lead to the potential for structural distortion to occur via flawed injection of externally imposed stimuli,
such as the fear psychosis and the culture of fear discussed in the above Part
II. As the broader distortion potential is dependent on the collective consciousness, it is quite possible that the culture of fear may have created a
fertile ground for a drone culture to become integrated within the societal
landscape. Such eventuality will indeed bring a disastrous outcome.
Finally, the Fourth Amendment protection for drone surveillance must
be evaluated by the threshold question of whether the act of surveillance
was a type of search found within the meaning of constitutional jurisprudence. Although simple in its framing, its evaluation is fraught with multiple layers of deterministic paradigms—the area of the search, the technology utilized in the search, the societal expectation of privacy related to the
search, and finally, whether a warrant was required or, if based on an exception, could the search be conducted without a warrant. Unfortunately,
the final answer might come down to a judicial determination based on vartrusion lack permission. However, when applying the test in subsequent
cases, even Harlan himself only referenced the objective component.
Winn, supra note 63, at 11.
66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67. Id.
68. See Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale, supra note 16.
69. See Ghoshray, Doctrinal Stress, supra note 27, at 596-97 (observing the original
intent of the Fourth Amendment as creating a constitutional bulwark against governmental
intrusion against individual’s private affairs inside the seclusion of their home).
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ious exceptions identified in existing jurisprudence or determination via a
faulty paradigm premised on the post-9/11 legal landscape. This calls for an
examination based on a fundamental framework, which is detailed below.
IV.

LOOKING THROUGH THE FUNDAMENTALS

A nuanced framework for analysis of the Fourth Amendment application may introduce error in judgment. Such examples are common within
contemporary society’s evolutionary trajectory, as has been documented in
the legal framework of the law of 9/11 and the cultural framework of addiction to fear. The discussion in the preceding Parts underscored the structural
weaknesses in the evaluative aspect of the Fourth Amendment’s expectation of privacy. This prompts us to confront various legitimate unanswered
questions. Framed adequately, each of these questions could lead to separate reasonable expectations from their unreasonable counterparts.70 When
the collective consciousness of society is infected with flawed irrationality,
how can we objectively define society’s reasonable expectations? Do we
have the objective capability to measure such reasonableness? In the contemporary environment, where the masses are inundated with false information, propaganda, and fear-mongering,71 is it even possible to objectively
define a reasonable expectation? For example, the contemporary discourse
continues to remain silent on the corporate agenda in creating a new industrial sector for domestic drones. Similarly, the shaping effect of 9/11 has
been instrumental in developing the current law enforcement mindset that
allowed for the contemplation of domestic surveillance. Yet, the social
landscape is silent on such important issues of our time. This silence compels us to delve deeper into the issue of domestic drones, and consider two
fundamental dimensions—privacy as a fundamental liberty component and
sublimation of some rights of individuals from a social contract doctrinal
viewpoint.
A.

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE THROUGH THE PRISM OF FUNDAMENTAL
PRIVACY

Privacy is much more fundamental than contemporary society has allowed it to become. Domestic drones’ continuous surveillance will further
erode privacy of individuals within the society. This core privacy concern is
70. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that an individual’s
interest in privacy involves determining whether an individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as “reasonable”).
71. See Marjorie Cohn, Trading Civil Liberties for Apparent Security is a Bad Deal,
12 CHAP. L. REV. 615, 637 (2009) (arguing that following 9/11 the Bush Administration
attempted to maintain a state of fear in the United States).
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the central most rationale for rejection of a drone culture, as the concern
emanates from a much deeper right-to-life connotation of privacy espoused
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis more than a century before.72 Recognizing how technology’s onslaught may intrude into an individual’s private affairs, both Warren and Brandeis cautioned us about the prospect of
abrogation of privacy73 by observing that, “[N]ow the right to life has come
to mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let alone; the right to liberty
secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term ‘property’
has grown to comprise every form of possession—intangible, as well as
tangible.”74
This plea for establishing a broader “right to be let alone”75 could not
be any more relevant than what we are witnessing today. Conceptually,
drones can be introduced in various aspects of human activities that take
place within a society, and, as such, it can be connected to a law enforcement interest. If drones are allowed in most of these instances of human
lives, the right to be let alone will forever be lost in domestic American
lives—an eventuality none of us should be ready to embrace. While Warren
and Brandeis’s passionate observation was a plea for privacy in the midst of
nineteenth-century technology,76 its continued relevance is beginning to
reverberate louder than ever, as society is confronted with a significant attenuation of privacy in the twenty-first century.
Every human has a fundamental right to be left alone in a zone of private seclusion where the individual must be free from a supervisory entity’s
intrusion. More than a century back, this conception of privacy was the
operating principle that had animated Warren and Brandies’ recognition of
the sacrosanct realms “of private and domestic life.”77 Domestic surveillance undoubtedly interferes and, most times, obstructs an individual’s right
of privacy within the confines that the individual creates.78 The revered
fundamentals of privacy must equally extend to both the interior of the individual’s physical dwelling as well as the individual’s digital confines of
the home-like community of connected individuals. Technology may have
allowed a supervisory entity, such as the government or its law enforcement
72. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-95 (1890) (discussing the need for privacy as technology developed
in 1890).
73. See id. at 193.
74. See id.
75. See Connie Davis Powell, “You Already Have Zero Privacy. Get Over It!”:
Would Warren and Brandeis Argue for Privacy for Social Networking?, 31 PACE L. REV.
146, 148 (2011) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 72, at 193) (noting details on various third-party mechanisms in communication, social media, and the Internet).
76. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 72, at 195-96.
77. See id. at 195.
78. See id. at 205.
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agencies, the ease, access, and frequency of information to monitor individuals. It does not, however, necessarily strip the individuals from exercising
their right to be left alone.79 Allowing drones in the domestic sky will alter
this right and allow the fundamental right to privacy to move into inevitable
obsolescence.
B.

CONFLICT WITH THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Almost as old as modern civilization, social contract theory originated
from Plato and Socrates. Nurtured in the modern era by Hobbs,80 Rousseau,81 and Hume,82 the social contract theory posits that an individual in a
society surrenders some of her freedoms and submits to the authority of a
supervisory entity in exchange for the protection of such individual’s remaining rights. Implicit in this paradigm is a core belief of individual consent. This idea of individual consent as a prerequisite of fundamental liberty
has been further solidified in the contemporary era by legal scholar Randy
Barnett.83 Yet, the digital explosion and the ease of technology has created
a dystopian nightmare where the related supervisory entities, like the government and law enforcement agencies, may be rejecting this idea of social
contract theory. Through implicit rejection of social contract, the supervisory entities are gradually depriving individuals some of their rights, such as
the right to privacy within their own confines. This emerging phenomenon
must be evaluated for its full implications within the context of domestic
surveillance via drones. In a futuristic scenario where a domestic drone may
be buzzing over a community, either searching for a fleeing criminal or
guarding against crime from being committed, the tracking and storing
mechanism would automatically record private moments and personal affairs for which the individuals have not provided consent. Social contract
theory prohibits such law enforcement intrusion on private space of individuals. If we were to balance the rights relinquished against the rights being preserved, it would be revealed that no significant preservation takes
79. See Chip Walter, A Little Privacy, Please, SCI. AM (June 17, 2007),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=a-little-privacy-please.
80. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651).
81. See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS
(Hackett Publishing Company 1987) (1754).
82. See generally DAVID HUME, ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene
F.
Miller,
ed.
1987)
(1742)
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL35.html.
83. See generally RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (Princeton Univ. Press, paperback ed. 2005) (2003); excerpted
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (Choper, Fallon, Kamisar,
Shiffrin, eds., 10th ed., forthcoming) available at http://www.amazon.com/Restoring-LostConstitution-Presumption-Liberty/dp/0691123764/randyebarnetbost/.
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place. Yet, a significant portion of individual rights is being put in jeopardy,
if not in peril. Tracking of an individual via drones or recording an individual’s private moments give rise to other concerns. In yet another reversal
for implications of privacy, when such recordings take place, the surveillance and data storing may erroneously create illegitimate proxies for an
individual profile based on imprecise or incomplete vignettes of life evolving within a fleeting temporal sequence. Law has yet to respond to this imprecise and flawed subjective assessment based on intrusive privacy violations, unbridled data mining, and tracking that unmanned aerial vehicles
might be engaged in.
Drones raise many issues related to pervasive video surveillance. In a
free society, public places, public squares, and places of assembly must be
free from the prying eyes of the government and its law enforcement agencies. When a surveillance drone is deliberately parked in front of a specific
landmark at designated times tracking or video recording individual activities in a public place, the issue of the sacred social contract must certainly
rise within the discourse. Social contract theory categorically emphasizes
the value of providing private seclusion for individuals, and thus, no individual can be put on surveillance without prior consent. Yet, drones do not
require consent. Rather, within the current legal framework, they may be
operating in an extra-legal environment, causing injury to the integrity
within the social structuring.
Drones will usher in the unwarranted era of automated law enforcement, where technology will be used to impart justice with minimal human
interaction. In the absence of a full evaluation of the scope, context, and
parameters of such mechanism, it is not clear as to what kind of appellate
review procedure will be available during a drone-fuelled criminal justice
mechanism. Furthermore, from a surface level analysis, it is certainly not
the most robust and prudent justice mechanism. The fairness and equity of
justice is highly difficult to achieve without the objectivity and rational
introspection that a human-centric justice mechanism can bring in.
Within the current socio-legal framework, social contract theory is not
consistent with allowing an unbridled governmental right to mass surveillance via drones. Doing so will undoubtedly signal the attenuation of privacy, eventually witnessing the right to privacy becoming eviscerated. For
example, an individual staying within the permissible bounds of social
norms and legal framework can engage in adulterous affairs with another
consenting adult within the private confines of one’s dwelling. While the
act’s trajectory will be mediated by individual preference and the ethical
determination subject to such preference, the social contract theory would
posit that the product of such act is clearly not for public consumption.
Therefore, there should not be any public recording of such acts.
Yet, in a drone enabled societal landscape, several significant outcomes are possible. By virtue of video surveillance, there will be a video
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recording that could be subject to voyeurism, blackmailing, unscrupulous
and discriminatory persecution, and institutional abuse, among others. Once
a digital product is created, the scope and duration of its existence is unlimited. For example, unscrupulous action of law enforcement operating with
the benefit of lack of legal precedents can access such prohibited material.
This will introduce a flawed assessment of an individual’s criminal culpability for any number of predictive analytic purposes. Such a search into an
individual’s secluded zone of private affairs is against the social contract
theory. Moreover, it violates both the individual’s First Amendment right to
freedom of expression and the Fourth Amendment right to be secure within
an individual’s private surroundings. In the absence of settled law, robust
legislation, and precedent judicial determination, drone surveillance could
become an unbridled exercise in developing unfair inference and that places
privacy and anti-discrimination in a collision course along the way while
implicating basic fundamental constitutional rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

The saga of drones over the domestic sky in the Unites States has just
begun. Unless lawmakers and policy analysts are careful in developing the
appropriate framework, drones could end privacy for all, for which this
Article is a stark reminder. The objective of this Article has been a two-fold
inquiry. In the first, it presented the landscape that allowed governmental
conceptualization of domestic surveillance of its own citizens. In the second, it examined a limited set of legal and philosophical dimensions to
understand whether allowing domestic drones within law enforcement
framework comports with fundamental principles of liberty.
At a fundamental level, drones in the domestic sky are emblematic of
human civilization’s distortionary trajectory. Drones for domestic surveillance also represent how human ingenuity may have taken an undesirable
detour towards an addiction to fear post 9/11. This culture of fear has allowed law enforcement interests to subsume some of the cherished fundamental liberties. Against a backdrop of law’s inability to catch up with
technology’s explosion, placing drones in the sky to spy on citizens may
bring total eclipse of individual privacy. Loss of privacy impacts freedom
of expression, which impacts both ingenuity and the democratic process.
Therefore, society must not allow the privacy of its citizens to be sublimated under governmental interest of surveillance, for which this Article has
submitted two fundamental rationales. First, despite the growing cacophony
of law enforcement’s proclamation of the advantageous use of drones, the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution continues to be a viable bulwark against a pervasive abrogation of individual privacy. Second, social
contract theory reminds us of the ethical danger of the state unilaterally
removing rights from its citizens.
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Finally, looking through the prism of a rights narrative, the right of a
state to place drones over its citizens’ heads must be evaluated within the
framework of aligning rights of entities within a shared space. In this context, whenever a living entity is enclosed within a physical space, multiple
legal rights are created. The state has the right to regulate and control activities within its space. Similarly, citizens residing within the space also have
concomitant rights to be free from intrusion. As I have shown elsewhere,
rights have to be envisioned in order for them to be executed.84 Therefore,
within the context of drone surveillance, we can legitimately ponder over
whose rights must be given primacy. First, if there is unilateral play, such as
the governmental imposition upon the citizens without consent, the inquiry
should be focused on whether we recognize remedy without rights. This is
precisely what the locus of purview surrounding drone surveillance must be
centered on. Second, how can the rights of citizens be recognized if they
were never part of the original discussion? This is the most vexing, and the
most pivotal question that must be answered. Indeed, the answer might very
well determine the future course of privacy rights of citizens in the United
States.

84.

See Ghoshray, Guantánamo, supra note 18.

